Migration and the Risk of Violent Conflict and Instability by Amirali, Asha
   
The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons learned. Helpdesk 
reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an introduction to the most important 
evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-based review of published literature and 
consultation with subject specialists.  
Helpdesk reports are commissioned by the UK Department for International Development and other Government 
departments, but the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, the UK Government, 
K4D or any other contributing organisation. For further information, please contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
Helpdesk Report  
Migration and the risk of violent 
conflict and instability 
 
Asha Amirali 
Institute of Development Studies  
18 March 2020 
 
 
Question 
 
What robust evidence is there that migration (including internal migration and forced 
displacement) contributes to the risk of violent conflict and instability? 
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1. Overview 
 
The central finding of this review is that despite disciplinary differences of conceptual framing and 
method, the literature agrees that there is nothing inevitable about migration leading to 
conflict. Instead, it is the nature of socioeconomic and political conditions in receiving areas that 
determines the risk of political violence, not the fact of migration itself.  
 
Rural-urban migration and climate-induced migration are the two pathways to violent conflict 
considered in this report.1 The literatures and the cases they consider are distinct but the 
analytical efforts and search for causal linkages are shared. The literature on the link between 
migration and violent conflict and instability straddles a large number of academic disciplines 
including anthropology, sociology, political demography, geography, peace and conflict studies, 
political science, and many others. This rapid review surveys a sample of the academic literature 
only and has not engaged policy literature except through academic references to it. This is both 
for reasons of time and because of what appears to be a weak evidence base for most policy 
reports on the issue.   
 
 
2. Contextualising the migrationconflict debate 
 
There are repeated references in the academic literature to the fact that policy debates and 
media reporting are not informed by research findings and are often ‘ahead of the evidence’ (eg: 
Muggah 2012, Selby 2017, Hartman 2010). Scholars argue that academic and policy focus on 
migration in the last couple of decades has been driven by Western countries and governments 
perceiving migration as a threat to the established order, leading to a securitisation of migration 
and ‘hardening of neo-Malthusian positions’ (Muggah 2012:14). Hartman analyses the discourse 
around climate refugees and argues that US national security policy has been shifting towards 
taming ‘ungoverned spaces’ that are perceived as threats to US interests; she finds that 
development assistance has been increasingly subsumed under this objective and that the 
approach to climate-induced migration is not driven by enough evidence. 
 
3. Rural-urban migration  
 
Rural-urban migration has been of much policy concern in recent years, with policymakers 
focused on curbing inflows into cities. Most scholarly works reviewed for this report believe this 
focus to be misplaced (eg: Ostby 2016, Montgomery et al. 2008, Beall and Fox 2011) while 
recognising the tremendous challenges that rapid urbanisation presents in most developing 
countries. This literature notes that that a combination of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors drives in-
migration to cities and towns. Poverty, war, natural disasters, and recurring adverse climate 
conditions drive people out of rural areas, but even in the absence of these factors, urbanisation 
is necessitated by an expanding global economy – as incomes rise, the demand for non-
agricultural goods and services rises, stimulating the growth of urban-based production (Beall 
                                                 
1 Time constraints prevented the inclusion of refugee militarisation, but the logic of analysis and the debates 
characterising the field appear to be similar. 
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and Fox 2011). However, states are failing to provide adequate security, employment, housing, 
and other essential services in cities, leading to increased instability, violence, and political 
upheaval. Violence is produced by the interaction between socio-economic deprivation and 
migration, which serves to further strain already stretched resources and exacerbate political 
conflicts.  
Contribution to urban growth 
 
It is a common mistake to overstate the contribution of rural-urban migration to urban 
population growth. Montgomery (2008) notes that the urban demography literature (and this 
could be extended to contemporary policy discourse on urbanisation) does not pay sufficient 
attention to the fact that about 60% of the urban growth rate in developing countries is accounted 
for by natural urban population increases (excess of births over deaths) and 40% to migration 
and spatial expansion or reclassification of rural areas (ibid: 761). For similar reasons, Beall and 
Fox (2011) write that ‘the traditional research and policy focus on rural-urban migration among 
those concerned with the potentially social destabilising effects of urbanisation is misplaced’ 
(ibid: 5). This trend continues today: according to a 2018 UN report, urban growth in developing 
countries results primarily from natural increase with the exception of some countries in Asia and 
Africa (China, Thailand, Rwanda, Indonesia, Namibia) where rural-urban migration has played a 
major role (UN 2018: 6). 
Link with violent conflict 
 
Scholars differ in their understandings of how rural-urban migration impacts conflict and research 
conclusions are often contradictory or arrived at through such methodologically different 
approaches as to be incomparable. A common insight across these studies however, is that the 
interaction between migration and poor socio-economic conditions leads to violence and 
unrest.   
 
From the qualitative literature, Beall and Fox (2011) find very little evidence that the process of 
urbanisation is associated with an elevated risk of conflict or violence in Africa or elsewhere. 
They write that ‘the process of urbanization is a neutral phenomenon, but it may contribute to a 
transformation in the geography and intensity of violence if underlying socioeconomic and 
political risk factors are not adequately addressed’ (ibid: 8). Scambari (2013) analyses how 
conflict and instability in Dili’s (capital of East Timor) squatter settlements is shaped by rural-
urban migration. According to the analysis, migration is a contributing factor to gang violence 
through its interaction with poverty, overcrowding, ethnic heterogeneity, and the unstable nature 
of authority in these areas.  
 
 
Box 1: Rural-urban migration and violence in Dili, East Timor (Scambari, 2013) 
 
Dili’s gang violence is an example of how migration interacts with socio-economic deprivation 
to produce conflict. The city experienced a massive rural-urban influx when wartime 
displacement and post-war rural-urban migration led to an eight-fold increase in the city’s 
population between 1975 and 2010. Migrants and receiving communities – often linked to 
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Existing quantitative research on conflict and urban population growth also does not 
support the concern that urban growth increases the chances of violence. In a widely cited 
study, Buhaug and Urdal (2013) find no support for what they call the ‘urbanisation bomb’, i.e. 
the hypothesis that urban population growth leads to increases in political violence. The study 
does not distinguish between in-migration and natural population growth, but of course rural-
urban migration is a contributing factor to population growth in most developing countries. 
 
Ostby (2016) is the only large-N quantitative study that explicitly tests how migration-induced 
urbanisation is linked to violence.2 Analysing a sample consisting of 34 major cities in 31 
countries in Africa and Asia over a 20-year period (1986-2006), she finds that  
 
‘[i]t is not the actual movement of rural people into the cities that creates social upheaval. 
Rather overall poor and unequal educational opportunities as socioeconomic 
marginalisation of rural—urban migrants seems to matter for lethal forms of urban 
political violence. Hence, judging from this study, city governments and other decision-
makers are best advised to aim at facilitating more equitable access to education and 
basic social services among city dwellers. Establishing formal institutions to help 
migrants assimilate into the social and economic life of the city might mitigate social 
fragmentation and reduce the levels of urban violence. Where there is political will, there 
may be significant scope for reducing urban inequalities’ (ibid: 509).  
 
                                                 
2 According to Ostby herself, writing in 2016, and a rapid search has not turned up others. 
migrants through familial, ethnic, and locality-specific ties – struggled with poverty, space 
shortages, and inadequate service provision.  
 
The hybrid and unstable nature of authority in these settlements mitigated against the 
establishment of effective informal social control by ‘traditional’ or rural-based institutions, 
and gangs (locally known as martial arts groups or MAGs and set up by the Indonesian 
military during the Indonesian occupation) and ‘big men’ quickly became powerful. Able to 
dispense small-scale patronage (small cash loans, alcohol, etc.) and attract young men into 
their fold, MAGs are a major force in Dili that frequently engage in violent conflict (ibid: 1940). 
Urban violence along the lines of village-based or district-based identities is a common 
phenomenon, i.e. place of origin continues to inflect meaning and structures conflict. 
Although fighting between gangs is ‘often glossed as competition, quite frequently it is 
between groups from the same district—for example, between Bobonaro families or between 
Ainaro families’ (ibid:1944). Following on from this, ‘gangs or MAGs clearly often serve as 
extensions of their communities or families in enacting vigilante or payback justice in 
communal disputes over resources, and perpetuate conflicts that are often rural in origin, and 
often of a longstanding, historical nature. They are very much part of their community and 
membership is tightly bound in a nexus of family, linguistic, rural and urban territorial identity’. 
(ibid: 1946-47) 
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Ostby mentions the example of Thailand’s slum upgrading programme which was highly 
successful in improving access to services for thousands of households ,and there is strong 
evidence from Rwanda demonstrating that a combination of political will and purposeful 
investment can reduce the prospects of migration creating urban unrest.  
 
 
4. Climate-induced migration 
 
There is a large and growing literature on climate-induced migration. The logic linking rural-urban 
migration and conflict applies equally to climate-induced migration and conflict3 and, again 
similarly, most of the evidence points at conflict emerging from the interaction of climate-induced 
migration with specific existing political and economic conditions in receiving countries. Critical 
voices within this field point to the ideologically charged nature of the debate on the climate crisis 
as well as migration, the inadequacy of research methods used to date, and the impossibility of 
producing ‘clear actionable evidence once more numbers have been crunched’ (Selby 2014: 
848). While some studies have found relatively direct links between environmental 
migration and conflict (eg: Reuveny 2007), more have disputed this, including by finding that 
                                                 
3 Although Reuveny (2007) observes that the scope and speed of this migration will be different. Climate change 
has so far induced slow changes, and when migration flows are small and slow migrants can be absorbed more 
smoothly, but he argues that more dramatic and rapid changes can be expected in the near future, in which case 
‘the forces promoting conflict in the receiving area may be stronger ceteris paribus’ (ibid: 660). 
 
Box 2:  Rwanda: a model of successful urbanisation?  (Goodfellow and Smith, 2013)  
 
Between 1991 and 2001, the population of Kigali trebled despite the death of around 1 million 
Rwandans. The urban population of the country grew at 18% in the aftermath of the 
genocide, in part as returning refugees sought anonymity. 18% was – and remains – a 
virtually unprecedented growth rate anywhere in the world. And yet, Kigali became an orderly 
city, one in which violence was a rarity. How did this happen?  
 
Violence was frequent in the fast-expanding city in the latter half of the 1990s, but against the 
odds Kigali took a different path. The police were consolidated into a disciplined and 
remarkably small force and the use of overt violence by the state declined markedly. The 
ruling party – the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – benefited from what some have called 
‘genocide guilt’ on part of donors (Reyntjens 2004 quoted in Goodfellow and Smith: 3190) 
and aid money flowed through Kigali. A great deal of urban infrastructure was built, but 
perhaps more importantly, this money strengthened the RPF’s political hold and allowed it to 
put down deep roots in society and thus exert control over the city. The process was not 
inclusive, nor was it uncontroversial, and much has been written about the specificities of 
Rwandan governance (see for example Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012). However, Rwanda 
defies the migrationconflict hypothesis and is an example of how history can combine with 
politics to produce a very different outcome.  
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migration is a mechanism of adaptation and thus conflict mitigation (eg: Black et al. 2011, 
Hartmann 2010).   
 
Brozska and Frohlich (2016) review the arguments for establishing causal links between i) 
climate change and migration and ii) migration and conflict on the other. On the latter, they find 
that existing understandings are insufficiently complex and case studies present different – often 
contradictory – conclusions. For example experiences in Bangladesh and the northern part of 
India corroborate the hypothesis that migration increases conflict. The settlement of Bengali flood 
and storm victims on native land in the Chittagong Hill Tracts aggravated a drawn-out guerrilla 
war which ended in the late 1990s. Assam and Tripura also experienced violence between 
Bengali migrants and receiving populations. Reasons for the violence included ethnic tensions 
and competition over resources, a greater propensity to violence on part of refugees enjoying 
state support, refugees wanting to settle for the long term in the receiving areas, and refugees 
that had previously experienced violent conflict with the receiving population.  
 
Brozska and Frohlich maintain that such clear examples of migration leading to conflict are rare. 
In most cases, the relationship between migration and the onset or intensification of violence is 
significantly more speculative. As evidence, the authors cite examples from South Iraq, Syria, 
and Palestine where a multitude of other factors could reasonably be assumed to be equally 
important drivers of conflict. Raleigh et al. (2008) and Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) also find 
little evidence of a significant link between environmental migration and the onset of violent 
conflict. They argue that migrants generally have limited resources to organise violence. 
Again, the problem seems to be that there is often no clear, non-ideological justification for 
privileging one causal relationship over another in explaining the onset of violence. 
 
Reuveny (2007) analyses 38 cases of climate-induced migration and finds that 19 out of 38 
exhibited no significant conflict, and 14 of the conflict cases involved intra-state conflict, 
‘suggesting that conflict is less likely when migrants and residents are of the same ethnicity and 
religion, as is often the case for internal migration. It is also possible that the arrival of these 
migrants benefited the receiving areas’ (ibid: 668). He concludes that ‘environmental problems 
alone (sic) do not explain the outcomes reported, but they do appear to play important 
contributing roles in these episodes’ (ibid: 668). 
 
There is however not much empirical support for even Reuveny’s relatively cautious causal 
theory. The evidence on climate-induced mass migration is considered to be too weak (Brzoska 
and Frohlich 2016; Frohlich 2016) and scholars think political stability, economic conditions, state 
capacity, etc. appear empirically more relevant than migration. This position is supported by a 
recent study by Cattaneo and Bosetti (2017) that interrogates the state of the literature on the 
issue. The study finds no significant relationship between the presence of international 
climate migrants and conflict in destination countries. Indeed, the authors find that causal 
links are not adequately tested in the literature and that even if natural disasters do increase the 
risk of conflict, the literature does not explore the specific channels through which this 
relationship emerges, thereby weakening the argument.  
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Climate change, migration, and war in Syria – searching for 
explanations 
 
In 2015 the media exploded with stories about the link between climate change and the violence 
in Syria.4 The widespread (partial) explanation of the roots of the Syrian crisis was as follows: 
climate change led to drought, drought led to migration, migration led to conflict. While no one 
believes that climate change, drought and migration were the sole cause of Syria’s civil war, 
distinct causal claims were made about the role of climactic factors by world leaders, journalists, 
government reports, defence think tanks, academics, activists and others.  
 
In 2017, a group of scholars led by Jan Selby from the University of Sussex examined the 
evidence underlying these widely circulated claims linking climate change, migration, and 
violence. They found the bulk of assertions and arguments relied almost exclusively on three 
peer-reviewed studies which have been inordinately influential in shaping policy opinion and 
media coverage. All three studies, and most other discussions, argue that carbon emissions and 
global warming may have contributed to drought in Syria; that this drought led to large-scale 
internal migration; and that these migrants were significant contributors to the unrest that was 
sparked in 2011 which subsequently spiralled into civil war.  
 
Selby et al. (2017) found ‘meagre’ and 'extremely weak’ evidence underlying each of these 
claims, with the authors observing that ‘no attempt is made within these studies either to 
statistically correlate climactic and conflict variable or to make use of original interview or 
ethnographic research; instead all three studies rely exclusively on journalists in and policy 
advocacy sources. Moreover, none of them refers to the body of academic literature on the 
causes of Syria’s civil war’ (239), something that Hartman (2010) also notes about the literature 
on Darfur’s war as a ‘climate conflict’. 
 
They present two reasons that suggest the contrary, i.e. that drought-induced migration does not 
seem to have had any significant impact on the unrest. Firstly, interview data conducted by one 
of the authors for a research project with Syrian refugees shows that migrants from drought-
affected areas did not participate in protests, were not targets of subsequent repression, and left 
as soon as protests started and returned to their regions. Secondly, none of the political 
demands made by Syria’s early protest movements related directly to either drought or migration. 
Had migrants been significantly involved, this would have been reflected in the discourse (they 
would have been targeted as ‘the problem’ or been the ones making demands). Instead, 
demands centred on civil rights, political freedoms, and economic liberalisation grievances (the 
authors go on to list concrete demands). They conclude that the evidence is not strong enough to 
make the arguments that have now become commonplace regarding the climactic roots of the 
Syrian crisis. 
                                                 
4 See for example ‘Researchers link Syrian conflict to a drought made worse by climate change’, New York 
Times, March 2, 2015; ‘Climate change helped spark Syrian war, study says’, National Geographic, March 2, 
2015; ‘Global warming contributed to Syria’s 2011 uprising, scientists claim’. The Guardian, March 2, 2015. 
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5. Conditions exacerbating migrationconflict 
 
To systemise the observation common across the literature, i.e. that migration interacts with a 
host of other factors to create specific violent and non-violent outcomes, Brzoska and Frohlich’s 
(2016) typology of receiving regions may be useful. They identify three types of receiving regions 
as more conflict-prone than others, although they are careful to avoid statements that imply 
necessity. The classification is derived from a survey of climate-induced migration and conflict 
but may be equally applicable to rural-urban and other types of migration5.  
 
 Regions with extreme resource scarcity. Temporary migrations into such regions are 
unlikely to prompt conflict but if populations appear to be settling permanently, chances 
of violence increase. Resource-poor regions usually host refugees fleeing war and 
natural disasters and are not chosen by those in search of employment or improved 
quality of life. International humanitarian assistance usually accompanies the influx of 
such forced migrants and alleviates the most critical scarcities, but because they are 
temporary (at least at first), migrants are unlikely to compete for land and employment 
opportunities. Violent conflict is therefore unlikely at this point. It becomes much more 
likely however, when people have no option to return home or choose to settle in the host 
country and enter the competition for scarce resources.     
 Regions with high levels of pre-existing conflict. When migrants move into 
communities with on-going conflicts, the likelihood of them becoming a trigger for 
violence is higher. In particular, when migrants shift the demographic balance in places 
where identity conflicts are already underway, migration is more likely to result in the 
intensification or initiation of violence.  
 Regions unwilling to accept ‘others’. People may move into communities unwilling to 
accept them. Despite ample resources, discourses in these receiving communities often 
pivot around perceptions of scarcity (unemployment, reductions in standards of living 
etc.) and perceived threats to traditional values and lifestyles.  
  
                                                 
5 It could also be expanded, based on the literature reviewed here, to include state capacity in the receiving region.  
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